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Abstract 
In 2015, Li et al. (Quantum Inf Process (2015) 14:2171–2181) proposed an 
arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) scheme based on the chained controlled-NOT 
operations encryption. However, this paper points out that in their scheme an attacker 
can forge a signature without being detected. Therefore, Li et al.’s AQS scheme 
cannot satisfy the unforgeability and non-repudiation property. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2001, Gottesman and Chuang [1] firstly brought out the idea of designing an 
arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) scheme based on fundamental principles of 
quantum physics. In their AQS scheme, both the authentication of identities and the 
integrity of the classical messages or quantum states can be guaranteed over insecure 
quantum channels. After that, various AQS schemes have been proposed [2-20].  
In 2015, Li et al. [21] proposed an AQS scheme based on the chained 
controlled-NOT (CNOT) operations encryption, which makes each qubit of quantum 
signature relevant to each other. However, in this paper, we show that, an attacker can 
forge signer’s signature without being detected in Li et al.’s AQS scheme. Therefore, 
the requirements of unforgeability (i.e., neither the signature receiver nor an attacker 
can forge a signature or change the content of a signature) and non-repudiation (i.e., 
after signing a valid signature, a signer should not be able to deny that) cannot be 
satisfied in Li et al.’s AQS scheme. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Li et al.’s AQS 
scheme. Section 3 describes the forgery attack in Li et al.’s scheme. Section 4 
summarizes the result. 
2 Review of Li et al.’s AQS Scheme 
In this section, at first we describe the technique of the chained CNOT operations 
encryption (in Section 2.1), which is used in Li et al.’s AQS scheme. Hereafter, a brief 
overview of Li et al.’s AQS scheme is given in Section 2.2. 
2.1 The Chained CNOT Operations Encryption 
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Suppose the secret key  1 2, ,..., nK k k k  is a permutation of  1,2,...,n , which is 
shared between the sender and the receiver. The quantum message P  can be 
encrypted to  KC E P  by using the chained operations encryption as follows, 
where 
1
n
i i
P p , 0 1i i ip    , , Ci i   , 
2 2
1
i i
   , and 
1 i n  .  
       
1 11 1
CNOT , CNOT , ...CNOT ,
n nK n k n k k
C E P p p p p p p P

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Here,  CNOT ,
ii k
p p  denotes as the CNOT operation which takes ip  as a 
controlled qubit and 
ik
p  as a target qubit. If ik i , then  CNOT ,i ip p  performs 
the identity operation I , where 
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
CNOT
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and 
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
I
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
The corresponding decryption method is shown as follows.  
       
1 21 2
CNOT , CNOT , ...CNOT ,
nK k k n k
P D C p p p p p p C   
2.2 A Brief Review of Li et al.’s AQS scheme 
In Li et al.’s AQS scheme, three participants are involved: the signer Alice, the 
receiver Bob, and the trusted arbitrator Trent. In their scheme, Alice wants to sign the 
quantum message P  and transmits it to the signature receiver, Bob, where 
1
n
i i
P p , 0 1i i ip    , , Ci i   , 
2 2
1
i i
   , and 1 i n  . 
Subsequently, Bob can verify Alice’s signature with the help of Trent. If P  is 
composed of known quantum states, arbitrary copies of P  can be produced. If P  
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is composed of unknown quantum states, then at least three copies of P  should be 
prepared, i.e. 
1
P , 
2
P , and 
3
P , where 
1 2 3
P P P  . Li et al.’s AQS 
scheme is composed of three phases: the initializing phase, the signing phase, and the 
verifying phase.  
 
Initializing phase 
Step I1. Trent shares the secret keys  1 2, ,..., nA A A AK k k k  and  1 2 2 1, , ..., nB B B BK k k k   
with Alice and Bob, respectively, through the unconditionally secure 
quantum key distribution protocols, where  1 2, ,..., nA A Ak k k  is a permutation 
of  1,2,...,n  and  1 2 2 1, ,..., nB B Bk k k   is a permutation of  1,2,...,2 1n . 
Besides, Bob shares a secret random bit string Br  with Trent. 
Step I2. Alice generates n  Bell states 1 2 ... n     , 
 
1
00 11
2
i AB AB
   , 1,2,...,i n , where the particles A and B  
indicated their owners Alice and Bob, respectively. Then, Alice sends the 
particle B of each Bell state to Bob through an authenticated method. 
 
Signing phase 
Step S1. Alice randomly chooses a  1 2, ,..., nR R R RK k k k , where  1 2, ,..., nR R Rk k k  is a 
permutation of  1,2,...,n . Subsequently, Alice transforms 
i
P  into 
 
Renc Ki i
P E P  based on RK  by using the chained CNOT operations 
encryption, where 1 3i  . 
Step S2. Alice generates the signature  
1AA K enc
S E P  based on AK .  
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Step S3. Alice performs Bell measurement on each 
, 2enc i
p  of 
2enc
P  
 1,2,...,i n  with each particle A of the Bell states to obtain 
 1 2, ,..., nA A A AM M M M , where  , , ,iAM        , 
 
1
00 11
2
    ,  
1
01 10
2
    , 1 i n  . 
Step S4. Alice sends 
3enc A A
S P S M    to Bob.  
 
Verifying phase 
Step V1. Upon receiving the quantum sequences, Bob performs the unitary 
operations on  3enc AP S  based on Br  to obtain  3enc AP S

 
 2 1 3
i
Brn
i x enc AP S  . Subsequently, Bob calculates BY 
 3BK enc AE P S
 
 
 
 based on BK  and then sends BY  to Trent.  
Step V2. Trent decrypts BY  based on BK  and obtains  3enc AP S

 . After that, 
Trent decrypts  3enc AP S

  by using Br  and gets 3enc AP S . Trent 
transforms 
3enc
P  into  3AT K encS E P  based on AK , and then 
compares AS  with TS  by using quantum fingerprinting [22]. If 
A TS S , he/she sets the verification parameter 1V  ; otherwise, 
he/she sets 0V  . 
Step V3. Trent recovers TS  to obtain 3encP , and then sends
 3BT K enc AY E P S V    to Bob.  
Step V4. Bob decrypts TY  to obtain 3 , ,enc AP S V , then he measures V . If 
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0V  , he rejects the signature; otherwise, he continues to the next step.  
Step V5. Based on the technique of quantum teleportation, Bob recovers his particle 
B into enc BP  by performing the corresponding unitary operations which 
are indicated in AM . After that, Bob compares enc BP  with 3encP . If 
3enc encB
P P , then Bob informs Alice to publish RK ; otherwise, Bob 
rejects the signature. 
Step V6. Alice publishes RK . 
Step V7. Bob decrypts 
3enc
P  with RK  and then obtains 3P . Hence, Bob holds 
 ,A RS K  as Alice’s signature for 3P  and Trent holds AK  and RK  to 
judge a possible dispute in the future between Alice and Bob. 
3 The Forgery Attack 
In this section, we point out that a malicious attacker, Eve, is able to forge Alice’s 
signature in Li et al.’s AQS scheme as follows. 
 Eve generates a fake quantum signature pair  ,E RS K  as Alice’s signature for 
the quantum message EP , where 1 0
n
E E iS P    and RK  is a random 
permutation which is published in Step V6. Subsequently, Eve provides  ,E RS K  
and EP  as a signature of EP  from Alice to Trent. In order to verify the signature, 
Trent checks the pair of  ,E RS K  and EP . That is, Trent calculates 
AT RT K K E
S E E P  and compare TS  with ES , where E  denotes the chained 
CNOT operations encryption and AK  denotes the shared secret key between Alice 
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and Trent. Since, the CNOT operation does not affect the states of 1 0
n
i , therefore, 
TS  is equal to ES . That denotes the signature pair  ,E RS K  and EP  did 
come from Alice.  
Therefore, Li et al.’s AQS scheme cannot satisfy the requirement of 
unforgeability. As a signature is possible to be forged, the signer could also deny a 
valid signature for his/her own benefit. As a result, the non-repudiation property in a 
signature scheme is not satisfied.  
 
4 Conclusions 
In this article, we have pointed out a security loophole in Li et al.’s AQS scheme by 
using the forgery attack. It would be a challenge to design a secure arbitrated quantum 
signature scheme. 
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